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During the Great Recession, many Irish workers experienced nominal earnings reductions, with about
50% of private sector employees receiving pay cuts at the height of the crisis. However, at the same time, a
substantial minority of workers continued to receive pay increases. In this paper we use a unique dataset
containing earnings on every worker in Ireland to examine the relative roles of worker and firm
characteristics in explaining this heterogeneity in earnings dynamics. Our results show that between-firm
effects play a small role in determining pay changes in Ireland. Although between-firm effects became more
important in the peak year of the economic crisis, the vast majority of earnings changes continued to be
driven by within-firm forces. These findings raise a number of important questions about the role of
morale and fairness in the wage-setting process.
INTRODUCTION
In an international study covering sixteen countries, Dickens et al. (2007) describe as
‘remarkable’ the variation in percentage wage changes across individuals in nearly every
country and in every year. This heterogeneity was also evident more recently, during the
Great Recession. Elsby et al. (2016) find substantial heterogeneity in wage changes over
this period in the USA and the UK. Doris et al. (2015), analysing wage adjustment in
Ireland from 2005 to 2013, find that 50% of private sector job stayers received pay cuts at
the height of the recession, while a substantial minority of workers continued to receive
earnings increases. In this paper we examine whether these pay cuts were concentrated in
particular firms or whether all firms were cutting wages for some workers but not for
others.
The role of the firm in explaining the variation of wage changes across workers is
important because it can shed some light on reward structures within firms. A
compressed distribution of pay changes within firms may reduce effort incentives. On the
other hand, substantial variation in within-firm pay changes that are not obviously
related to productivity may have a negative impact on perceptions of fairness. Such
fairness considerations are likely to be more important in times of recession, when firms
may be considering pay cuts. The seminal work by Bewley (1999) on why wages do not
fall during a recession finds that firms were very reluctant to cut nominal pay, and that
almost all the firms that had cut wages in his study did so due to financial distress; none
of the cuts was due to a weak labour market (Bewley 1999, p. 200). The main reason
given by firms for their reluctance to cut pay was that the negative effects on morale made
cuts counterproductive. This would lead us to expect that some firms—those in real
financial difficulty—would be willing to cut pay during the Great Recession, but others
would avoid cuts altogether. On this basis, we might expect to see the relative importance
of incentives and fairness changing when economic conditions worsen; the between-firm
component of wage changes is likely to grow substantially with the onset of a recession,
with a corresponding reduction in within-firm variation. On the other hand, if workers
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within firms are segregated, perhaps on the basis of occupations across which pay
comparisons are unlikely, then it may be possible to cut wages for a subset of workers
without giving rise to morale effects. In this case a recession that particularly affects a
subset of workers may lead to a rise in within-firm variation in pay cuts.
The increasing availability of matched employer–employee datasets has allowed
researchers to examine the role of firms in the wage-setting process (Abowd et al. 1999;
Cardoso 1997, 1999, 2000; Dustmann and Meghir 2005; Lazear and Shaw 2009a;
Sørensen and Vejlin 2011; Card et al. 2013). Typically, these studies find a significant role
for both worker- and firm-level characteristics in wage levels, but a stronger role for
individual characteristics in determining wage changes.
In this paper, we examine wage changes in Ireland from 2005 to 2013, a period that
includes the years of the Great Recession. During this time, the Irish labour market was
under severe stress, with unemployment increasing from 5.0% in January 2008 to a peak
of 15.2% in January 2012. We use an administrative matched employer–employee
dataset covering every firm and worker in Ireland. The availability of administrative data
reduces the potential biases from measurement error, which is often an important
problem in examining earnings changes. In addition, the fact that the data cover the
population of both firms and workers removes problems associated with small sample
sizes and selectivity in examining pay dispersion within firms. We apply a variance
decomposition technique to examine the relative contributions of within-firm and
between-firm heterogeneity to the overall observed heterogeneity in earnings changes for
job stayers documented in Doris et al. (2015). Following this, we examine the role of
available observable characteristics in determining individuals’ earnings changes within
firms, allowing for differences by firm size.
Our results show that most of the variation in pay changes in Ireland occurs within
firms, indicating that firms have considerable latitude in cutting wages. Although
between-firm effects become more important in the peak year of the economic crisis, even
then, at the height of the crisis, the vast majority of earnings changes are driven by
individual worker characteristics. As well as being informative about the wage-setting
process, these findings also raise a number of questions about the role of morale during
recessions.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section I discusses the
macroeconomic and policy context for the period covered by our data. Section II reviews
the relevant literature. Section III describes the data used for our analysis. Section IV
outlines the statistical and econometric methodologies used. Section V presents the
results, and Section VI concludes.
I. THE IRISHMACROECONOMIC AND POLICY CONTEXT, 2005–2013
As mentioned earlier, Ireland was one of the countries worst affected by the Great
Recession. After a period of very rapid growth from 1994 to 2007, when the average
annual GDP growth rate was over 7%, the economy collapsed, with output falling by
over 10% in real terms between 2008 and 2010. Labour market indicators followed this
pattern of boom and bust. Employment grew by 46% between 1998 and 2007, but then
fell by 15.9% between 2008 and 2012. Similarly, the unemployment rate, which had been
relatively stable at 4–5% for most of the 2000s, rose from 5.0% in January 2008 to 13.2%
in January 2010, and continued to rise further to a peak of 15.2% in January 2012. It had
fallen back to 12.2% by the end of 2013. It is worth noting that the rise in unemployment
was particularly evident for males. The male unemployment rate increased from 4.8% in
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mid-2007 to 18.2% in early 2012; over the same period, the female unemployment rate
increased from 4.5% to 11.5%.
The effects of the global recession felt elsewhere were compounded in Ireland by the
bursting of a property bubble and the subsequent collapse of output and employment in
construction-related sectors. Because bank lending was so highly concentrated in
construction, Irish banks experienced huge losses and the government decided to
guarantee all bank liabilities in 2008. However, continued falling tax revenue and
exposure to bank liabilities resulted in the government deficit rising from almost zero in
2007 to 13.8% of GDP in 2009 and a remarkable 32.1% in 2010 due to the banking
bailout.
The crisis resulted in the government undertaking a severe programme of austerity
measures, combining tax increases and expenditure cuts. As part of the expenditure cuts,
three rounds of pay cuts were undertaken in the public sector between 2009 and 2013,
with cuts ranging from 5% to 10.5% at each round. Although public sector workers are
not the focus of this paper, it might be expected that public sector pay cuts would have a
demonstration effect that would make similar cuts more acceptable for private sector
workers. An additional factor that may have made nominal wage cuts more acceptable
was that inflation was negative in 2009 (4.5%) and 2010 (1%). Indeed, Doris et al.
(2015) find that the proportion of private sector job stayers receiving nominal earnings
cuts almost trebled during the crisis, rising from 18% in 2006 to 50% at the height of the
crisis in 2009. The prevalence of both pay cuts and job losses was widely discussed in the
media, so workers were aware of the dramatic changes in the labour market as they
occurred.
It is worth commenting on the institutional framework for wage-setting that
prevailed in Ireland, and how it changed during the crisis. From 1987 to 2009, Ireland
operated a system of national pay agreements. Under this system, unions, government
and participating employers bargained at a national level over wage increases. These
agreements specified a schedule of percentage pay increases to be implemented over
three-year periods, as well as other non-pay measures. While these agreements were
always rigidly adhered to in the public sector, for private sector employers, adherence
was effectively voluntary; by the start of our sample period, anecdotal evidence suggests
that many firms granted wage rises in excess of the negotiated rates. In 2009, the national
wage-setting process was abandoned, having been put under pressure by austerity
measures undertaken by the government in order to restore public finances. On the
collapse of the agreements, a period of enterprise-level bargaining ensued. Under Irish
employment legislation, pay cuts constitute a change to the contract of employment and
as such must be agreed by the worker. During the crisis period in Ireland, there seems to
have been little difficulty in securing such agreement, given the prevalence of pay cuts
noted above and the absence of public protests.
The data that we analyse in this paper cover the last few years of the Irish boom, the
sudden onset of the economic crisis, the ongoing period of the Great Recession and the
first year of the recovery of the labour market. Having access to population earnings data
on all firms over this period provides a rare opportunity to investigate how dramatic
labour market changes impact on firms and their workers.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Initial analyses of the role of firms in the wage-setting process tended to focus on wages
within a single firm. For instance, Baker et al. (1994) analyse salary data for a single firm
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from 1969 to 1988. They find significant variation in both wage levels and wage growth
within the firm, even when the analysis is restricted to workers at the same grade. They
propose a simple learning model based on unobserved ability to explain the observed
patterns.
More detailed comparative analysis of firms’ wage-setting policies have until recently
been limited by a lack of appropriate data. Abowd et al. (1999) provide an early analysis
of the role of firms in wage-setting using matched employer–employee data. Their focus
is on earnings levels rather than changes, and their data cover over one million French
workers from about 50,000 firms. They find that firm effects, while important, are not as
important as individual effects in explaining the variation in wage levels in France. More
recently, Lazear and Shaw (2009a) provide a collection of country studies analysing the
role of the firm in wage-setting. They find that countries are very similar in the structure
of their wage levels, with the within-firm and between-firm variations both contributing
strongly to the overall standard deviation, with slightly less of the variation coming from
wage differences between firms.
Barth et al. (2016) focus on the role of the firm in the rise of earnings inequality in the
USA in recent decades. They find that the share of the variance of earnings accounted for
by the between-firm component grew from 46% to 49% from 1992 to 2007, and about
two-thirds of the growth in the overall variance of earnings between those two years was
accounted for by between-firm effects. Results for the USA shown in Song et al. (2019)
indicate a between-firm component somewhat lower than in Barth et al. (2016). Alvarez
et al. (2018) also investigate a change in earnings inequality—this time, a substantial
decrease observed in Brazil between 1996 and 2012. Their results show that the between-
firm component of earnings inequality was higher than in the USA between 1988 and
2012, accounting for around 55–60% of total inequality. They find that the fall in
between-firm inequality contributed more to the fall in overall inequality over the whole
period. Finally, Cardoso (1997) examines both worker and employer attributes as
sources of wage dispersion and of its rising trend in Portugal during the 1980s and early
1990s, and concludes that over 60% of the total dispersion in hourly wages is accounted
for by between-firm variation.
Many of the above-mentioned papers focus on the extent to which within- and
between-firm inequalities contribute to changes in inequality in earnings levels, but less
research has been done on the importance of the firm in explaining the variance of
earnings changes, which is the focus of this paper. However, several of the papers in the
Lazear and Shaw (2009a) volume focus on wage growth as well as levels. For the
Netherlands, Borghans and Kriechel (2009) find that wage growth differences within
firms account for about 87% of the variation in individual wage changes. They also
investigate how these results varied by firm size. They find that the overall variance of
wage changes was very similar across firm sizes, but that the magnitudes of the
components differed substantially. In particular, the firm-level component was much
higher (36%) in smaller firms and lower (4%) in larger firms. For Italy, Contini et al.
(2009) report that the within-firm standard deviation of wage changes is almost as high as
the standard deviation of individual wage changes. Lazear and Shaw (2009b) summarize
the findings from this collection of work by emphasizing the striking extent of within-firm
variation in wage changes; their overview of the results in Lazear and Shaw (2009a)
suggests that the within-firm standard deviation as a proportion of the overall standard
deviation of wage changes is of the order of 80–90% in most countries. Sørensen and
Vejlin (2011) apply the approach used by Abowd et al. (1999) to wage changes using
Danish data from 1980 to 2006. They find that worker effects explain almost twice as
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much of the variation in wage growth as firm effects. The evidence from these studies
suggests that within-firm variation is even more important for earnings changes than for
earnings levels.
A recent study by Park and Shin (2017) examines the extent and nature of downward
nominal wage rigidity in Korea. They extend this analysis to examining the role of the
firm in wage changes, particularly wage cuts. They find that most firms cut wages for
some but not all of their employees, indicating strong within-firm heterogeneity of wage
changes. This result indicates that the general finding that within-firm effects dominate
wage changes applies to cuts as well as rises.
Overall, the evidence seems to suggest that within-firm variation is more important
than between-firm variation in explaining the total variation of earnings changes among
job stayers. This finding is quite robust across different datasets from different labour
markets, including several European countries, the USA and South Korea. Thus despite
differences in the institutional setup, different labour markets appear to share a similar
reward structure.
In this paper we add to the above literature by examining the role of the firm in
explaining heterogeneity in wage changes in Ireland from 2005 to 2013. The fact that this
period includes years of both growth and severe recession allows us to examine the
stability of the firm’s role during a time of macroeconomic instability. Lazear and Shaw
(2009b), in their overview of the international evidence, comment that the stability of the
within-firm standard deviation of wage changes is an important area for future research.
Accordingly, we examine whether and how the breakdown between firm and individual
effects is affected by a severe recession.
III. DATA
The analysis is based on data taken from the Job Churn (JC) dataset, which is a
longitudinal administrative dataset covering the years 2005–2013 that has been compiled
by the Irish Central Statistics Office (CSO). These data combine three elements. Data on
annual earnings and weeks worked are provided by the tax authorities in respect of every
worker who was an employee during that year. Information on each worker’s age, gender
and nationality is provided the Department of Social Protection. Finally, data on the
sector in which each firm operates and the enterprise’s ownership structure come from
the CSO’s Central Business Register. Anonymized worker and firm identifiers are
included in the dataset to allow longitudinal analysis.
There are several significant advantages to using the JC data for our purposes. First,
the data cover every employer and almost every employee in Ireland over this period (the
top 0.1% of earners were excluded from the data provided to us by the CSO). Since
employers are obliged to file tax returns for every worker, problems associated with non-
response and attrition are absent, other than as a result of firms going out of business.
The fact that the data cover the population of both firms and workers allows us to carry
out detailed analyses of within- and between-firm inequalities in Ireland over the period.
Moreover, because they are administrative data based on tax returns, the earnings data
are largely free from measurement error; it is an offence to misreport workers’ earnings in
these returns. Finally, the data cover the period from 2005 to 2013, allowing us to
compare earnings dynamics before, during and in the immediate aftermath of the crisis.
Earnings are defined in the JC data as annual ‘reckonable income’ for the calendar
year; this is gross income from all sources including bonuses and taxable benefits-in-kind,
after non-taxable pension contributions have been deducted. In our analysis, we define
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an earnings change as the difference in log earnings between t  1 and t. In keeping with
previous work in this literature (e.g. Dickens et al. 2007), we define a pay cut as any
percentage pay cut greater than 0.1% in absolute value. As with most studies in this area
(see, for example, the studies in Lazear and Shaw 2009a), we focus on earnings rather
than hourly wages. It might be of additional interest to examine hourly wages, as it is
plausible that changes to hours of work occurred in response to the recession. However,
the JC data do not contain information on hours of work. Moreover, Doris et al. (2015),
using an alternative dataset containing hours of work (but no firm identifiers), provide
evidence that changes to hours were not the main driver of earnings cuts and pay change
heterogeneity. This is in keeping with recent work by Park and Shin (2017) for Korea.
The number of covariates available in the dataset is limited. Information on a
worker’s gender, age and nationality is provided, as is the industrial sector in which the
firm operates. Since we have the population of workers in all firms, we can calculate firm
size accurately. However, no data are available on the education level, occupation,
labour market experience or job tenure of the workers. To the extent that earnings levels
capture human capital characteristics, controlling for initial earnings can be used to
overcome the absence of education and labour market experience in our dataset.
Because of the different wage-setting mechanisms that pertain to the public and
private sectors, we focus only on private sector workers throughout this paper. In
addition, we consider only workers aged 25–60 and only firms with at least 10 such
workers. This minimum number of workers is set to ensure that measures of within-firm
variation in earnings are meaningful. We use observations on job stayers who work for
the same firm for all 52 weeks of both years of a year pair for which a pay change is
calculated. Because we have information on only the total number of weeks worked and
not when those weeks were worked, restricting the population to those working 52 weeks
is the only way we can be certain of excluding seasonal workers from our analysis. In
each year, full-year workers comprise about 40% of the total population. Focusing on
job stayers ensures that all pay changes can be attributed to a single firm. These
restrictions on the subset of workers that we use for the analysis leave us with between
300,000 and 385,000 individual pay change observations and 6000–7000 firms in any
given year.
IV. METHODOLOGY
Our first aim is to decompose the heterogeneity of individual pay changes into a part that
is due to the firm and a part that is due to the individual’s characteristics. We therefore
begin with a simple variance decomposition of the dispersion in pay changes into a
within-firm component and a between-firm component, following the methodology
outlined by Lazear and Shaw (2009b):
r2Dw ¼
XF
j¼1
pjr
2
Dwj þ
XF
j¼1
pj Dwj  Dw
 2
;ð1Þ
where r2Dw is the overall variance of individual earnings changes, r
2
Dwj is the variance of
earnings changes within firm j, pj is the share of workers who are working in firm j, Dwj
is the mean earnings change across workers in firm j, Dw is the mean earnings change
across all workers, and F is the number of firms. Thus the first term of the right-hand side
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of equation (1) gives the within-firm variance, which captures the importance of
individual characteristics; the second term gives the between-firm variance, which reflects
the importance of the firm in determining wage changes. As noted by Song et al. (2019)
the between-firm component captures all firm-related changes, including changes in the
sorting of workers between firms. This variance decomposition is carried out separately
for each year pair from 2005/6 to 2012/13. Thus although both the firm and the worker
must be observed in both years of a given year pair, firms and workers can enter and exit
the population so the same workers and firms are not necessarily observed across all year
pairs.
While the decomposition in equation (1) examines pay changes generally, it is also
useful to analyse the role of the firm in determining the incidence of pay cuts as discussed
earlier. We therefore also employ a decomposition of the variance of pay cuts, as follows:
r2c ¼
XF
j¼1
pjr
2
cj þ
XF
j¼1
pj cj  c
 2
:ð2Þ
In this case, r2c is the overall variance of a binary variable c that denotes a pay cut,
r2cj is the variance of pay cuts within firm j, cj is the proportion of workers whose
earnings were cut within firm j, and c is the proportion of all workers whose earnings
were cut; pj is as defined earlier.
Although these decompositions allow us to examine the relative importance of
within-firm and between-firm heterogeneity, they do not explain how individual
characteristics affect wage changes within a firm. To examine this issue, we estimate firm
fixed effects models of individual wage changes for each pair of years in our sample. In
particular, we estimate
Dwijt ¼ Xijðt1Þbt þ lj þ eijt;ð3Þ
where Dwijt is the earnings change for worker i in firm j between t  1 and t, and Xij(t-1)
is a vector of the characteristics of worker i in firm j at time t  1. The inclusion of the
firm fixed effects lj means that the estimated b terms capture the average within-firm
effect of worker characteristics on individual pay changes. Estimating the lj from
equation (3) also allows us to re-estimate the proportion of the variance of earnings
changes due to firm effects, this time taking into account differences in worker
composition across firms.
V. RESULTS
Variance decompositions
As mentioned in Section II, the literature on decomposing wage levels into between- and
within-firm parts is more extensive than that on decomposing wage changes. For
comparative purposes, we therefore begin our analysis by decomposing wage levels into
between- and within-firm effects using a decomposition that is analogous to that given in
equation (1). The results are given in Table 1. Column (1) indicates how annual earnings
inequality evolved in Ireland over the nine-year period. This shows that for full-year
workers, inequality was stable from 2005 to 2009, but then began to increase so that by
2013, inequality in annual earnings had increased by just under 10%.
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Columns (2) and (3) of Table 1 show the relative importance of the between-firm and
within-firm components of earnings inequality. The results show that prior to the crisis,
the relative importance of the firm was stable; in each of these years from 2005 to 2008,
firm effects accounted for about 42% of the overall variance. This accords with the
research on the variance of wage levels discussed in Section III, which typically indicates
that both within-firm and between-firm factors are important, with the within-firm
component tending to be slightly stronger.
It is notable, however, that from 2010, the role of the firm became more important;
by 2013, the percentage of the growing variation in annual earnings accounted for by the
firm was 48%. Thus the growth in annual earnings inequality among job stayers over this
period is mainly accounted for by between-firm inequality. However, even during the
crisis period, this variance decomposition gives results that are well within the range of
those obtained for other countries.
We now turn to the analysis of earnings changes, which is the main focus of the
paper. Before carrying out the variance decomposition, we first document the location
and spread of the pay change distribution over our data period. Table 2 shows the mean
and standard deviation of the difference in log annual earnings for each year pair, as well
as the median, 10th percentile and 90th percentile pay changes. The data clearly show the
shift to the left of the pay change distribution as a result of the crisis. In 2005/6 and 2006/
7, the annual earnings of most job stayers increased substantially, with a mean change of
TABLE 1
VARIANCE DECOMPOSITION OF INDIVIDUAL ANNUAL EARNINGS LEVELS
Year
Overall variance, earnings levels Between proportion Within proportion
(1) (2) (3)
2005 0.387 0.42 0.58
2006 0.382 0.43 0.57
2007 0.382 0.42 0.58
2008 0.383 0.42 0.58
2009 0.379 0.43 0.57
2010 0.396 0.44 0.56
2011 0.412 0.46 0.54
2012 0.417 0.46 0.54
2013 0.425 0.48 0.52
TABLE 2
DISTRIBUTION OF INDIVIDUAL ANNUAL EARNINGS CHANGES
Year Mean earnings change S.D. earnings change Median 10th percentile 90th percentile
2005/6 0.068 0.137 0.058 0.042 0.196
2006/7 0.068 0.140 0.068 0.046 0.199
2007/8 0.048 0.144 0.045 0.069 0.175
2008/9 0.022 0.155 0.006 0.171 0.103
2009/10 0.003 0.144 0 0.108 0.129
2010/11 0.019 0.146 0.008 0.084 0.143
2011/12 0.021 0.143 0.011 0.077 0.136
2012/13 0.027 0.136 0.015 0.069 0.142
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6.8% in both years. The first signs of the oncoming crisis can be seen in 2007/8 with wage
growth slowing, and by 2008/9, both the mean and median wage changes were negative,
reflecting the severity of the effects of the recession on workers. Thereafter, some
recovery can be seen, but the mean wage change remained below 3% throughout, and the
median change was even lower, lying between 1% and 1.5%.
Table 2 also reveals significant heterogeneity in wage growth across individual
workers. Even in 2006/7, when the median wage change was 6.8%, the worker at the 10th
percentile of the wage change distribution experienced a reduction in earnings of 4.6%,
while the worker at the 90th percentile received an earnings increase of 19.9%. Even
greater variation is evident at the height of the crisis in 2008/9, with the standard
deviation of wage changes increasing to 15.5% from a pre-crisis norm of about 14%. In
2008/9 the median job stayer in Ireland experienced a pay cut of 0.6%. However, workers
at the 10th percentile of the wage change distribution received a substantial 17.1% cut in
earnings, while those at the 90th percentile saw their earnings increase by 10.3%. While it
is evident that many workers experienced significant hardship as a result of the recession,
this was not true of every worker.
As noted earlier, one possible explanation for the pattern of pay changes is that the
observed heterogeneity reflects differences between firms in pay adjustment strategies.
Alternatively, the heterogeneity may reflect differences within firms, as some workers
receive large rises while other workers in the same firm receive smaller rises or cuts. This
may arise due to differences in worker characteristics that are observed by the firm or due
to incentive pay structures that are necessitated by unobserved worker effort. The
decomposition presented in Table 3 examines which of these explanations is more
important, and clearly comes down in favour of within-firm heterogeneity.
The results show that in the pre-crisis years, the percentage of the variance of
earnings changes accounted for by the within-firm component was between 85% and
88%. This figure is very similar to the 87% obtained by Borghans and Kriechel (2009) for
the Netherlands. It is also consistent with the conclusion drawn by Contini et al. (2009)
in the same volume that in most countries, the standard deviation of within-firm pay
changes is very similar to the overall standard deviation of pay changes across
individuals. It seems that in Ireland, as in other countries, wage changes are linked more
to an individual’s characteristics than to their firm’s fortunes. However, as discussed
earlier, to the extent that firms’ fortunes interact with worker characteristics, the
distinction between the two may be subtle.
The role of individual characteristics may weaken during a downturn if morale issues
become more important when pay cuts are under consideration. Given that Ireland was
TABLE 3
VARIANCE DECOMPOSITION OF INDIVIDUAL ANNUAL EARNINGS CHANGES
Year Overall variance, earnings change Between proportion Within proportion
2005/6 0.0187 0.13 0.87
2006/7 0.0196 0.12 0.88
2007/8 0.0207 0.15 0.85
2008/9 0.0239 0.25 0.75
2009/10 0.0207 0.18 0.82
2010/11 0.0211 0.15 0.85
2011/12 0.0204 0.10 0.90
2012/13 0.0185 0.10 0.90
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particularly badly hit by the Great Recession, the time period covered by our data
provides a useful setting for examining this question. Table 3 shows that with the onset
of the crisis, the percentage of the variance of earnings growth accounted for by within-
firm factors fell sharply to 75% in 2008/9. To the extent that sectors were affected
differentially by the recession, it is plausible that firms reacted differently to the
downturn, leading to the firm becoming more important in determining wage changes.
This could also have been facilitated by the abandoning of the Irish national wage-setting
process in 2009, although as noted earlier, many private sector firms were not adhering to
the national agreements for several years prior to the crisis. However, despite the increase
in the importance of the between-firm variance in 2008/9, within-firm inequality still
dominated the variance of wage changes. Moreover, the drop in the importance of the
within-firm variance was very temporary; by 2010/11, it had returned to its previous level
of 85%, and then surpassed it in the two subsequent years, rising to 90%. This suggests
that the increase in the between-firm variance for 2008–9 reflects a response to the Great
Recession rather than any institutional change.
The above decomposition focuses on the variance of wage changes within and
between firms but does not pay any attention to the shape of the distribution of these
changes. It could be that variances within firms are all similar, resulting in a high
proportion of the total variance being attributed to within-firm effects, but that higher
moments of the within-firm wage change distribution are quite different. This may
particularly arise if negative pay changes are qualitatively different to positive ones; for
example, the distribution of earnings changes for firms whose median pay change is
negative could be skewed to the left, while for firms giving mostly pay rises, it may be
skewed to the right. In this case, the variance of pay changes within firms could be
similar, while the shapes of the distributions differ. To examine this issue, we carry out
the decomposition of the earnings cut binary variable described by equation (2). This
allows us to examine the extent to which the prevalence of wage cuts within a firm
explains the heterogeneity in the overall propensity to receive wage cuts.
The results for pay cuts are given in Table 4. The first point to note is that the
incidence of pay cuts increased sharply with the onset of the crisis, and then remained
high in the following years. Turning to the decomposition itself, we see that the results
are in keeping with those presented for pay changes. Although the contribution of
between-firm effects increased during the recession, differences within firms still account
for over 74% of the variance in wage cuts in 2008/9.
TABLE 4
VARIANCE DECOMPOSITION OF INDIVIDUAL ANNUAL EARNINGS CUTS (BINARY VARIABLE)
Year
Earnings cuts
proportion
Overall variance,
earnings cuts
Between
proportion
Within
proportion
2005/6 0.184 0.150 0.100 0.900
2006/7 0.191 0.154 0.114 0.886
2007/8 0.246 0.186 0.144 0.856
2008/9 0.523 0.249 0.260 0.740
2009/10 0.475 0.249 0.245 0.755
2010/11 0.393 0.239 0.182 0.818
2011/12 0.353 0.228 0.143 0.857
2012/13 0.333 0.222 0.144 0.856
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To examine the role of the firm in pay cuts in more detail, Figure 1 shows a
histogram of the employment-weighted incidence of earnings cuts within firms for 2008/
9, the year in which wage cuts peaked. The figure shows that the distribution is almost
uniform, with very few firms at or near 0 (no cuts) or 1 (all cuts). Figure 2 shows the same
histogram, but without employment weighting. A prominent spike is now visible at 1,
which tells us that those firms that did cut pay for everyone tended to be small; perhaps
the morale considerations mentioned above are more important within small firms than
within large ones. Nevertheless, even in the unweighted histogram, the vast majority of
firms—about 90%—cut pay for some workers but not for others. This striking result,
which is also found by Park and Shin (2017) using Korean data, does not provide strong
support for a morale-based explanation of resistance to pay cuts.
Within-firm regressions
As noted earlier, variation in pay changes within firms can result from heterogeneity in
either observable or unobservable characteristics. We now examine the role of available
observable factors in explaining wage adjustments within firms, and whether these
factors changed during the crisis. To do this, we estimate the fixed effects regression
model given in equation (3), regressing individual annual earnings changes on a vector of
individual characteristics including age, initial pay (which we may regard as a proxy for
initial skill level), gender and nationality. Note that fixed firm-level characteristics cannot
be included, as these are not identified once firm effects are introduced. As for the
variance decomposition analysis, the observations used are restricted to job stayers aged
25–60 working with the same firm in each year of a given year pair, and to firms with at
least 10 such workers; as before, the individuals and firms included can vary across year
pairs. The results are given in Table 5.
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FIGURE 1. Employment-weighted distribution of within-firm pay cut incidence, 2008/9.
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Turning first to the coefficient on initial pay, we see that within firms, pay changes
were progressive; higher-paid workers within a given firm received smaller pay rises or
bigger pay cuts throughout the period. One explanation for the negative coefficient on
initial pay is that firms are concerned with fairness and deliberately protect lower-paid
workers from large pay cuts, as suggested by Bewley (1999). However, the estimated
coefficient on initial pay will be influenced by the nature of the stochastic component of
wages. Random fluctuations in wages from year to year will induce regression to the
mean: workers higher up the within-firm earnings distribution in a given year are likely to
have arrived there through a combination of talent and good luck. The luck element is
unlikely to persist into the following year, resulting in smaller wage rises for better-paid
workers and larger pay rises for lower-paid workers. On the other hand, any persistence
in the shocks will offset the downward bias associated with regression to the mean. In this
context, it is, however, worth noting that in our analysis the estimated coefficient on
initial pay becomes markedly more negative in 2008/9. This seems likely to reflect greater
employer concerns about fairness as it is not clear why regression to the mean would
have become more pronounced during the recession.
With respect to age, the negative coefficients show that older workers receive smaller
pay awards within firms in all years, which is consistent with concave age–earnings
profiles. However, the size of the coefficient drops substantially in 2008/9. It recovers
slightly thereafter, but the coefficient is still half its pre-crisis size by the end of our
period. In 2005/6, an employee who was 10 years older than another worker within the
same firm would expect to have a pay increase 1.3 percentage points lower than her
younger colleague; by 2012/13, her expected pay increase was only 0.7 percentage points
lower.
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FIGURE 2. Unweighted distribution of within-firm pay cut incidence, 2008/9.
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In all years, male workers receive larger pay changes within firms even after
controlling for initial pay. This result is consistent with discrimination. However, the
result may also reflect males choosing a reward structure with lower pay at the start of
their careers in return for higher subsequent earnings growth, with women choosing
flatter profiles. Alternatively, it may reflect differences in bargaining power. Card et al.
(2016) provide evidence that females gain less than their male colleagues when their firm
becomes more profitable. It is noteworthy that in our analysis, the male advantage fell
from about 1.5 to 1 percentage point with the onset of the crisis, and stayed at this lower
level thereafter. It is not obvious why the Great Recession would have induced a
reduction in discrimination. On the other hand, it is plausible that the fall in the male
coefficient arose because the male advantage in bargaining power during the boom
weakened once profits fell and unemployment increased. Since male occupations were
particularly hard hit during the recession, differences by gender in employment changes
may also be relevant in explaining these findings.
Finally, the effect of Irish nationality on pay changes is interesting. Before the onset
of the crisis, being Irish had a negative effect, with Irish workers receiving pay changes
about 1 percentage point lower than their non-Irish co-workers. This surprising effect
could be due to differences in unobservable characteristics or due to the assimilation of
non-nationals over time. However, during the recession, the coefficient became zero, and
then turned positive. It could be that the characteristics of Irish workers became more
favourable relative to non-Irish workers over the period, perhaps because of differential
emigration from the Irish and non-Irish groups.
The last row of Table 5 shows the proportion of the variance due to between-firm
effects, after controlling for the observed characteristics. Comparing our results with
Table 3, we see that the proportion of the variance attributed to between-firm effects is
greater once worker characteristics have been accounted for, as expected. The between-
firm variance accounts for between 16% and 34% of the overall variance of pay rises
using this methodology, as opposed to 10% to 25% in the unadjusted analysis. However,
it is noteworthy that even after controlling for these observed characteristics, the
majority of the variation in pay changes is accounted for by within-firm effects.
Furthermore, the time patterns in the adjusted and unadjusted variance components are
very similar: the between-firm proportion rose substantially in 2008/9, then immediately
fell back and was lower at the end of the data period than at the start. Despite the
evidence of some changes in personnel practices, the overall impression is that the Great
Recession did not permanently alter the role of the firm in wage change determination.
TABLE 5
FIXED EFFECTS MODEL OF INDIVIDUAL ANNUAL EARNINGS CHANGES
2005/6 2006/7 2007/8 2008/9 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13
Initial pay 0.0303 0.0277 0.0390 0.0578 0.0380 0.0319 0.0390 0.0388
Age 0.0013 0.0013 0.0011 0.0003 0.0005 0.0006 0.0006 0.0007
Male 0.0150 0.0151 0.0141 0.0092 0.0122 0.0105 0.0107 0.0109
Irish 0.0110 0.0106 0.0060 0.0000 0.0008 0.0013 0.0007 0.0040
Constant 0.4334 0.4092 0.4993 0.5973 0.4165 0.3679 0.4465 0.4533
Between
proportion
0.201 0.171 0.212 0.336 0.233 0.232 0.161 0.157
Notes
Given the very large samples used in our analysis, all coefficients are highly statistically significant.
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Firm size effects
It is not feasible to include firm size as an explanatory variable in the fixed effects model
estimated in the previous section; the firm size parameter would be identified from firms
who are changing their size substantially and who may not be typical of all firms.
However, firm size is potentially an important variable in our analysis, for two reasons.
First, firms that are large tend to be foreign-owned and/or exporters to a far greater
extent than small and medium-sized firms (Lawless et al. 2014); they therefore face
different competitive environments than other firms. In addition, larger firms were less
likely to face financial distress during the crisis (Lawless and McCann 2013). Second, the
wage-change histograms presented in Figures 1 and 2 provide some evidence that across-
the-board pay cuts were more common in small firms, perhaps because the morale effects
of treating workers differently are stronger in small firms.
TABLE 6
FIXED EFFECTS MODEL OF INDIVIDUAL ANNUAL EARNINGS CHANGES: FOR ALL FIRMS
AND BY FIRM SIZE
2005/6 2006/7 2007/8 2008/9 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13
Initial pay
All 0.0303 0.0277 0.0390 0.0578 0.0380 0.0319 0.0390 0.0388
Small 0.0366 0.0357 0.0435 0.0588 0.0415 0.0387 0.0368 0.0370
Medium 0.0259 0.0216 0.0328 0.0496 0.0318 0.0240 0.0265 0.0272
Large 0.0276 0.0247 0.0391 0.0621 0.0392 0.0314 0.0487 0.0477
Age
All 0.0013 0.0013 0.0011 0.0003 0.0005 0.0006 0.0006 0.0007
Small 0.0009 0.0011 0.0010 0.0005 0.0006 0.0005 0.0005 0.0007
Medium 0.0014 0.0014 0.0011 0.0004 0.0005 0.0006 0.0007 0.0008
Large 0.0015 0.0015 0.0012 0.0002 0.0005 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006
Male
All 0.0150 0.0151 0.0141 0.0092 0.0122 0.0105 0.0107 0.0109
Small 0.0134 0.0129 0.0118 0.0055 0.0119 0.0085 0.0103 0.0090
Medium 0.0123 0.0147 0.0120 0.0053 0.0098 0.0073 0.0060 0.0081
Large 0.0178 0.0167 0.0169 0.0139 0.0138 0.0138 0.0142 0.0143
Irish
All 0.0110 0.0106 0.0060 0.0000 0.0008 0.0013 0.0007 0.0040
Small 0.0097 0.0081 0.0036 0.0005 0.0012 0.0028 0.0031 0.0041
Medium 0.0099 0.0113 0.0058 0.0006 0.0001 0.0025 0.0023 0.0051
Large 0.0127 0.0121 0.0077 0.0006 0.0010 0.0004 0.0024 0.0030
Constant
All 0.4334 0.4092 0.4993 0.5973 0.4165 0.3679 0.4465 0.4533
Small 0.4845 0.4825 0.5295 0.5881 0.4410 0.4252 0.4093 0.4246
Medium 0.3911 0.3461 0.4304 0.5174 0.3557 0.2868 0.3213 0.3374
Large 0.4148 0.3861 0.5169 0.6522 0.4347 0.3738 0.5577 0.5522
Between proportion
All 0.201 0.171 0.212 0.336 0.233 0.232 0.161 0.157
Small 0.196 0.167 0.213 0.311 0.234 0.261 0.178 0.170
Medium 0.125 0.118 0.133 0.259 0.184 0.129 0.118 0.120
Large 0.073 0.099 0.132 0.159 0.164 0.098 0.098 0.074
Number of firms
All 6057 6348 6763 6857 7006 6856 6929 7132
Small 5017 5248 5575 5627 5744 5631 5687 5833
Medium 855 912 909 1002 1027 997 1013 1060
Large 185 188 219 228 235 228 229 239
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We therefore estimate the fixed effects model separately for three firm-size categories:
small firms, with 11–49 workers in the first year of the relevant year pair; medium firms,
with 50–249 workers; and large firms, with over 250 workers. The results are reported in
Table 6. For each variable, the first row replicates the result shown in Table 5; the
additional rows are the results of models estimated separately for small, medium and
large firms, respectively.
The results indicate some differences in the magnitudes of the coefficients between
small, medium and large firms. For example, the initial pay effect is slightly more
negative for small firms than for others, while the effect of being Irish is slightly more
negative in large firms, and the effect of being male is more positive in large firms.
However, overall the time patterns are very similar across all firm sizes.
The last three rows of Table 6 report the proportion of the variance within a firm-size
category that is due to between-firm differences, after controlling for observed
characteristics. In this respect, it is clear that large firms differ from small and medium
firms. Among large firms, an even lower proportion of the total variance is accounted for
by between-firm effects than is the case for small or medium firms. This is similar to
findings by Borghans and Kriechel (2009), and may indicate that morale considerations
are less important in larger firms or that large firms tend to be concentrated in a limited
number of industrial sectors and have similar occupational structures.
In summary, although firm identity did become more important during the Great
Recession, the overall picture that emerges from the variance decompositions and the
fixed effects models is of a labour market in which within-firm forces dominate pay
changes.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we use administrative data to examine the relative role of worker and firm
characteristics in explaining the dispersion of wage changes for job stayers in Ireland.
Our results show that firm effects play a small role in Ireland, as in other countries for
which similar analyses are available. Although firm effects become markedly more
important in the peak year of the economic crisis, the vast majority of earnings changes
continue to be driven by individual worker characteristics. This finding runs contrary to
our expectations. When we examine this further by investigating the incidence of pay cuts
directly, we find a stronger role for the firm, but nevertheless, the vast majority of pay
cuts occur in firms where other workers’ pay is not cut.
To control for differences in worker characteristics within firms, we estimate a firm
fixed effects model of individual pay changes. We find evidence of changing personnel
practices as a result of the Great Recession. These changes occur across all firm sizes and
in many cases persist beyond the immediate onset of the crisis. When account is taken of
worker characteristics, the role of the firm in determining pay changes increases. But it
remains the case that most of the variance of individual pay changes is accounted for by
worker characteristics rather than the identity of the firm.
The prevalence of wage cuts in Ireland during the Great Recession offers a rare
opportunity to examine the behaviour of firms in a distressed labour market. Morale
considerations lead us to expect that in such circumstances, firms that cut wages will do
so for all or most workers, so that between-firm effects would be the dominant
component of the variance of pay cuts. While we did see an increase in the between-firm
component with the onset of the crisis, within-firm effects still explained over 74% of the
variation in wage cuts. This suggests that morale issues may be less important than
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employers reported to Bewley (1999), perhaps because workers within firms are
segregated along occupational lines across which pay comparisons are unlikely.
Alternatively, an individual worker’s morale may be less negatively affected by a pay cut
when there are numerous reports of pay cuts in the wider economy, even if the pay of
other co-workers is not being cut. Although employment changes are not considered in
this paper, perhaps the negative morale implications of workers within the same firm
being given differential pay changes are entirely offset by workers’ gratitude for retaining
their jobs at a time of rapidly increasing unemployment.
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